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Abstract 
The NASA Technical Fellows periodically conduct State-of-the-Discipline assessments. The 
GN&C Technical Fellow contracted Harlan Brown & Company in 2007 and 2009 to conduct 
independent, third party studies to gain unbiased insight and understanding into the attitudes 
and beliefs of NASA's GN&C Community of Practice (CoP). The paper first outlines the 
background, objectives and methodology of the studies. The paper then summarizes key study 
results of the 2007 baseline study, as well as the 2009 update. The update was then used to 
track and monitor perceptions, identify performance trends, identify areas where further 
improvement needs to be made in NASA's GN&C discipline. It also generated feedback on the 
recently developed GN&C CoP online knowledge capture and learning site. 
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1. Introduction 
The primary purpose of this paper is to document key results, analysis, and conclusions 
from a GN&C discipline assessment study using data gathered by Harlan Brown & 
Company (Brown) for the NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) in July and 
August 2009. This 2009 study was an update to the first-ever study of the GN&C CoP 
produced in 2007, also conducted by Brown. NESC originally enlisted the support of 
Brown in 2007 to perform an objective, third party assessment of the GN&C discipline at 
NASA. The assessment was a survey of both GN&C NASA people and GN&C experts 
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outside of NASA at industry and academia. This 2009 study was aimed at providing 
NESC and NASA with a tool to monitor and track results from the 2007 study. Both 
studies focused on developing perceptions of the relative strength of GN&C as an 
engineering discipline across NASA. This paper explores how perceptions varied among 
NASA contacts at NASA HQ, across several NASA centers, as well as at industry, 
academia and consultants. The perceptions of the contacts on the performance trends, 
strengths and weaknesses ofNASA's GN&C discipline addressed six specific sub-
discipline areas: workforce, analytical methods and tools, developmental testbed facilities 
and engineering laboratories, testing cap~bilities, collaboration, and technology 
development. 
A. NESC Background 
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), established in July 2003 in response 
to the Columbia accident, provides independent assessment of technical issues for NASA 
programs and projects. As its fundamental mission the NESC strives to set the example 
for engineering and techni~al excellence within NASA. The primary purpose of this 
independent and objective organization is to increase safety through engineering 
excellence. NESC relies on an institutionalized "Tiger Team" approach to solving 
problems. At the core of the NESC is an established knowledge base of technical 
specialists pulled from the ten NASA Centers and from a group of partner organizations 
external to the Agency. This group of engineering experts is organized into 15 discipline 
areas e:alled Technical Discipline Teams (TDTs). TDTs include "ready" experts from 
across NASA, industry, academia and other government agencies, Fifteen (15) NASA 
Technical Fellows, based in the NESC organization, are responsible for assembling, 
maintaining and providing leadership for the TDTs and serve as stewards for their 
disciplines. The Technical Fellows support of the Office of the Chief Engineer (OCE) 
and they are an independent resource to the Agency and industry to resolve complex 
issues in their respective discipline areas. As part of their discipline stewardship role the 
NASA Technical Fellows periodically perform State-of-the-Discipline (SoD) 
assessments of their respective engineering disciplines. This SoD assessments are used to 
inform senior managers and decision makers within both the OCE and the Office of 
Safety & Mission Assurance (OSMA) at NASA Headquarters. In the SoD assessments 
the Technical Fellows summarize their discipline's readiness to support goals & 
objectives of each NASA Mission Directorate, identify the primary technical 
challenges/barriers for their discipline, and provide advocacy recommendations for their 
discipline. The NESC organizational model along with the role, purpose and experiences 
of the NESC GN&C TOT are described in detail in References 1 and 2. 
B. Motivation foi_- The Study 
Having previously gathered the views, insights and observations of the GN&C TOT the 
NASA Technical Fellow was interested in expanding the collection of such data from a 
wider cross-section of the NASA GN&C CoP. The objective study was thus conceived of 
as an effective way for NESC to gain un-biased insights and understandings into the 
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attitudes and beliefs of the GN&C practitioners, managers and users across NASA, along 
with a modest number of industry partners as well. It was anticipated that the study 
results could inform the planning and technical road mapping tasks of the GN&C TDT. 
More specifically, the study findings were seen as an effective way to directly provide 
valuable information on recent successes, discipline trends, technical challenges, and 
other issues facing their individual disciplines to support the Technical Fellows' update 
of the GN&C State-of-the-Discipline. These expectations have been fulfilled. 
C. What Were Key Study Objectives Of The 2009 GN&C Discipline Assessment? 
The 2009 study was initiated and managed by the NASA Technical Fellow for GN&C. 
Prior to interviewing any contacts a standard set of probing interview questions was 
defined in collaboration with Brown's Senior Project Manager. 
These interview questions were formulated with the following strategic objectives in 
mind for the study: 
> Determine what has changed that makes contacts believe differently about the 
state of NASA's GN&C discipline in 2009 vs. its state in 2007? 
> Determine to what degree do contacts recognize improvements in the GN&C 
discipline at NASA? Determine specifically which GN&C areas have improved? 
> Determine what weaknesses or areas for improvement exist within the GN&C 
discipline at NASA that still need to be addressed? 
> Determine what are NASA's greatest technical challenges in the GN&C arena? 
> Determine how well known and how useful is the relatively new GN&C 
Community of Practice website to NASA's GN&C engineers? 
. - - -- --·-- ------ --- .. , --
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D. Who Was Contacted For The 2009 GN&C Discipline Assessment? 
A total of 51 reports were gathered including 43 NASA and 8 non-NASA reports. For 
comparison, in the 2007 study, 76 total reports were gathered. The 43 NASA reports were 
gathered from GSFC (9), JSC (9), JPL (6), LaRC (5), MSFC (4), NASA HQ (3), and other 
NASA centers (7) including ARC, DFRC, GRC, and KSC. Of the 43 NASA reports 13 were 
gathered from GN&C core TDT members. The 8 non-NASA reports were gathered form 
support contractors, consultants and academia. 60% of the 2009 contacts were contacted in 
the 2007 study. CxP sources (63%) and non-CxP sources (37%) were contacted. 
GN&C providers (71 % of the sample) and GN&C users (29%) were contacted in the 2009 
study. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of study sample in 2009 vs. 2007 studies - by role 
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Contacts perspective was NASA-wide (25% of sample) versus their individual NASA 
Center (75%) in the 2009 study. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of study sample in 2009 vs. 2007 studies - by perspective 
All study contacts were identified by the NASA GN&C Technical Fellow as a representative 
cross-section sample of the GN&C CoP: including individual technical contributors, flight 
project leaders, and engineering line organization managers. To preclude the influence of non-
objective biases on the study results there was no reliance on.any other data inputs apart from 
the information gleaned during the individual phone interviews. 
E. How was the assessment gathered? 
All information was gathered through in-depth phone interviews with sources. Brown did not 
rely on the NESC GN&C Technical Fellow for any study input other than who to contact and 
what to ask them. The 2007 and 2009 studies were both carried out without attribution; that is 
without attaching source's name to the reports generated from the telephone interviews. This 
was done in order to develop as open and honest an assessment as possible from the sources. 
Brown has produced a significant amount of customer and supply chain perception analysis 
assessments for Orbital Sciences, the National Institute of Aerospace, NESC Academy, NESC, 
and others. Brown's core competency for this study involved reaching and engaging through 
in-depth phone interviews, a select group of elusive/difficult to normally reach NASA subject 
matter experts, project managers and senior engineering line managers, as well as non-NASA 
experts. 
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2. Summary of 2007 Study Findings 
NESC conducted its first independent State-of-the-Discipline assessment on GN&C within 
NASA in 2007. The study represented a snapshot of opinion gathered in August-October 
2007. 
A. Sources Key Expectations Of NASA's GN&C Discipline · 
Brown first established sources opinion of what is most expected and valued from NASA's 
GN&C discipline. GN&C providers, such as design engineers and GN&C branch heads, 
identified what they believe is most valued of them. GN&C users, such as chief engineers and 
program people, identified expectations in supporting their areas and NASA's goals in GN&C. 
Expectations were identified by NASA sources and non-NASA sources. 
I I I 
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Figure 3. Key expectations of NASA's GN&C discipline - from NASA sources 
Technical compctence/desigs, and analysis expertise 1-----...----..----......... 164% 
I . 
1)2% 
I . 
1)2% 
I . 
132% 
• I 
,2r;. 
I 
127% ' 
,js~ 
Support mission through !heir experience i------,----" 
Hardware component expertise/competency t-----..-----
Systerns pcrspcc11ve/systern intcgralion role and functicnlmgmL t-----..---
Reswch studies and applied research/new tcchnotasy support i------..-
Collal>?ration/be a sood partner i------...--' 
Implementing GN&C work.' missions i-------
20% 400/, 60% 
Percent Of Sources 
80o/, 100% 
Figure 4. Key expectations of NASA's GN&C discipline - from non-NASA sources 
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B. Relative Strength Of NASA's GN&C Capabilities in 2007 
A major aspect of assessing the state of the GN&C discipline was to quantify people's opinion 
with regard to specific NASA GN&C capabilities - workforce competence, simulation and 
software tools, GN&C faci lities, collaboration and technology development activity. Brown 
also gathered an 'overall' rating of NASA's GN&C capabilities, a weighted average that takes 
all factors into account. The 76 total study sources contacted in 2007, on average, rated 
NASA's overall GN&C capabilities at a 3.9 (on a 1-5 scale, with 5= excellent). Analytical 
methods and tools and GN&C workforce were rated highest, while technology development 
and collaboration were rated lowest by study sources. 
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Figure 5. Relative strength of NASA's GN&C capabilities by area/across all sources 
(1 = poor, 3 = barely acceptable, 5 = excellent) 
A fairly narrow band of opinion was expressed in 2007 for the overall rating of NASA GN&C 
capabilities across the various sources contacted. 
NASA HQs 
GSFC 
JSC 
MSFC 
Average 
Non-NASA Sources 
JPL 
LaRC 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
3 
Overall Performance Rating 
4.3 
14.1 
4.1 
4.1 
13. ~ . 
1).8 
3.7 
1).7 
4 
Figure 6. Overall rating of NASA's GN&C capabilities by source 
(1 = poor, 3 = barely acceptable, 5 = excellent) 
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C. Rel,ative Strength Of NASA's GN&C Workforce 
The 2007 study also established a baseline of sources opinion regarding NASA's GN&C 
workforce. 
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Figure 7. Sources responses to question: Is there a right balance of people 
(demographics, engineering depth/skill .mix) in NASA's GN&C workforce? 
D. GN&C Collaboration Across NASA Centers 
The 2007 study also established how well NASA Centers perform GN&C collaboration (i.e., is 
there a sharing of experiences, resources, and analytical tools?) 
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Figure 8. Sources responses to question: How welJ do NASA field centers perform 
GN&C collaboration? (1 = poor, 3 = barely acceptable, 5 = excellent) 
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E. What People Said About The GN&C Discipline In 2007 
Table I provides the most relevant actual quotes from study sources grouped by topic. 
NASA's GN&C Workforce 
• "NASA's GN&C workforce is now unbalanced. We are top heavy with a high number of people 
able to retire in 4-5 years if they opt for it. Our workforce quality is very good. However, are we 
feeding the workforce so it continues to be strong in 5-10 years when we lose high numbers to 
retirement?" 
• "Workforce experience and competence varies greatly by center. JPL has extremely good engineers 
whose shear technical competence is very good, but it has weaknesses in being able to build 
something at an effective cost. GSFC designs more hardware than JPL but is not as complex. JSC 
has an extremely talented, older and top-heavy workforce, along with younger people with no 
design experience. LaRC has a younger group that lack experience and perspective." 
• "NASA has an aging workforce with too small a pool of new young talent being trained. NASA is 
not thinking ahead about what it is going to do when its aging workforce retires within 10 years." 
• "NASA has lost a generation of highly skilled GN&C engineers. NASA has brought in a lot of new 
hires in the past 8-10 years but they are not experienced enough yet." 
NASA's GN&C A11a{vtical Methods and Tools 
• "This is strong and improving greatly. GSFC is more willing to invest in this area because it is 
cheaper to build simulation models and software than it is actual ground test equipment." 
• "Asa result of the Mars missions JPL has had a lot of involvement with entry descent and landing 
tools and simulations that the rest of the agency doesn't have." 
• "JSC has a lot of expertise and are being very pro-active in this area. We are driving a lot of this 
(use/development of simulation tools) agency wide." 
NASA's GN&C Facilities 
• "GSFC l&T facilities are not consistently maintained as well as they should be because of sporadic 
use. Funding doesn't support facilities to be maintained." 
• "NASA hasn't kept up with satellite integration and test facilities . They have not been kept up to 
date." 
• "GSFC has strong capabilities in these areas, such as its GPS Constellation simulator, and makes 
them available to outside companies such as ATK. It is important that NASA continues to offer this 
to outside companies." 
Table 1. Relevant quotes regarding NASA GN&C capabilities in 2007 
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NASA's GN&C Collaboration 
• "A NASA-wide vision in the GN&C area is lacking. There is no integrated or planned NASA-wide 
GN&C discipline activity but only pockets of task-wise collaboration. We are not involved in an 
integrated vision in GN&C that taps into the strengths of each center. There is no clear vision from 
the top." 
• "There is a mix of competition and collaboration between the NASA centers. NASA centers and 
branches compete for the same work. We have to respect individual 's needs to differentiate 
themselyes. A dynamic tension is there and needs to be maintained. It is healthy competition." 
• "Successful collaborations have clearly defined roles and responsibilities and significant blocks of 
work for the NASA centers involved; e.g., on the Mars Science Laboratory between JSC, LaRC and 
JPL. Collaboration between GSFC and JSC on the Hubble robotic vehicle was a success." 
• "Work towards either reducing the competition between centers or leveraging the competition 
between centers to get something that is truly better and higher capability rather than fighting over 
the work." 
• "Develop discipline specific blue ribbon teams. They could share lessons learned and common 
practices. They could help form strategies, coordinate workshops, identify technical areas and help 
identify advanced technology development." 
•."The NESC should contribute papers and encourage collaboration models. The NESC needs to 
continue olu,rning atom~ in fostering more and more collaboration." 
NASA's GN&C Teclmolol!v Development 
• "Technology development isn't the focus, technology use is the focus. It has to be proven 
technology at the time it is being used. In areas of relative navigation sensors you are looking at 
technology development in order to improve and meet relative navigation requirements:'' 
• "Everything is driven by programs. There is no long-term vision for R&D at NASA. There is too 
much emphasis on the short term and how is this going to benefit the program, e.g., ISS, vs. NASA 
long term. ESA is starting to overtake NASA in many ways; e.g., ESA's GPS receiver blows away 
NASA's GPS receiver." 
• "NASA isn't pouring enough money into new technology but only maintaining current technology. 
NASA is so focused with on-going missions and operations. Little technology development is going 
on. This is even the case at the NASA research centers. Technology development efforts haven't 
been coordinated across NASA centers." 
Table 1 (Continued). Relevant quotes regarding NASA GN&C capabilities in 2007 
I 
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3. Summary of 2009 Study Findings 
NESC conducted a follow-up independent State-of-the-Discipline assessment on GN&C 
within NASA to keep infonnation gathered in the 2007 study current and up to date. 
This study represented a snapshot of opinion mostly gathered in July 2009. It is worth 
noting that the 2009 study coincided with the deliberations of the Review of U.S. Human 
Space Flight Plans Committee (the "Augustine Panel,,). The 2009 study was largely done 
to monitor and track 2007 study results but also addressed two new areas: 1) NASA's 
greatest technical challenges in the GN&C arena, and 2) how well known and useful is 
the recently developed GN&C CoP site regarded by NASA's GN&C engineers. 
A. What Has Changed That Makes Contacts Believe Differently About The State 
Of NASA's GN&C Discipline In 2009 Vs. 2007? 
Area 2007 Baseline Study 2009 Trend 
General state of • Study results are mixed, but mostly • Study results are mixed, but mostly 
theGN&C positive. positive. 
discipline • Overall rating was 3.9 • Overall rating remained at 3.9 
• NASA's GN&C discipline is • NASA's GN&C discipline remained 
currently strong, but uncertainty steady or slightly increased across all 
existed. areas except technology development. 
• 2007 performance trend is steady to • 2009 performance trend is steady to 
slightly improving. slightly positive. 
• Uncertainty exists because the GN&C • Uncertainty continues to exist; e.g., 
discipline is being threatened by NASA funding and outlook for CxP. 
workforce, NASA funding, schedule, • Concern exists regarding GN&C 
technology development challenges. facilities and technology development. 
• GN&C users perceive state of • GN&C users continue to perceive state 
discipline higher (4.1 avg.) than of discipline higher ( 4.1 avg.) than 
GN&C providers (3.9) GN&C providers (3.9). 
NASA Center • NASA HQ, GSFC, JSC, MSFC • JSC, NASA HQ and GSFC.expressed 
issues expressed above average overall high ratings in 4. t to 4.5 range.and 
ratings in 4. t to 4.3 range. improving trend. 
• Non-NASA sources, JPL and LaRC • Non-NASA sources, JPL and LaRC 
expressed below average overall expressed below average overall rat ings 
ratings in 3.7 to 3.9 range. in 3.5 to 3.9 range. 
Workforce • 4.2 avg. rating across all sources • Continued strong at same high rating 
issues • Key challenge is the wave of retirees • GN&C workforce perceived to be 
projected to leave NASA over the improving; e.g., increased experience in 
next 5 to 10 years. JSC's and GSFC's workforce. 
• Workforce prospects are uncertain • Workforce concerns/threats continue to 
due to past or on-going hiring gaps, exist with imminent retirement bubble 
attrition, and GN&C engineers in two to five (2 to 5) years. 
migrating to system engineering and 
management roles. 
Table 2. NASA's GN&C ~iscipline performance trend in 2009 vs. 2007 
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Area 2007 Baseline Study 2009 Trend 
. 
GN&C • GN&C collaboration considered • GN&C collaboration is still mixed but 
collaboration inadequate, with a 3 avg. rating improved to a 3.4 level across all 
between NASA across all sources sources mostly due to CxP. 
Centers. • Rated lowest by NASA ,-IQ (2.3) and • Key trends from 2007 to 2009: 
' 
non-NASA (2.4) sources. - JPL: 3.2 to 2.7 
• Rated by GSFC at 3 and JPL at 3.2. - LaRC: 3.9 to 3.2 
• Rated highest by JSC, MFSC and - MSFC: 3.7 to 3.5 
LaRC in the 3.4 to 3.9 range. - GSFC: 3 to 3.5 
• Rated by providers/2.8 and users/3.3. - JSC: 3.4 to 3.8 
• Many saw strong collaboration - Non-NASA: 2.4 to 3.6 
occurring on CxP, but many also - NASA HQ: 2.3 to 3.7 
believed that competition is more - GN&C providers: 2.8 to 3.2 
prevalent than cooperation. - GN&C users: 3.3 to 3.9 
GN&C 'hot • Workforce - top heavy, understaffed, • NASA budget constraints and 
button' issues strong competence/experience. uncertainty in NASA's direction and 
• Component hardware problems, e.g., mission, concerns over CxP outlook. 
reaction wheels and gyros. • GN&C workforce is more experienced 
• Strong collaboration on Program but threatened with a retirement bubble 
Constellation between JSC, MSFC, in 2-5 years. 
LaRC and GRC. • GN&C COP website is a good start, but 
• Strong analytical methods and tools needs to properly represent all NASA 
• CxP challenges centers including JSC. 
• Top technical challenge: Little 
inv~stment in next generation GN&C 
component & system technologies. 
_Table 2 (continued). NASA's GN&C discipline performance trend in 2009 vs. 2007 
As the data in Table 2 indicates the relative strength ofNASA's GN&C capabilities 
appears fairly stable. Little change occurred in sources 1-5 ratings ofNASA's GN&C 
capabilities between 2007 and 2009, other than significant improvement in collaboration. 
Analytical methods and tools and workforce continue to be the two highest, stand out, 
GN&C performance areas. Technology development is now the lowest GN&C 
performance area. · 
It appears that analytical methods and tools continue to be the highest rated NASA 
capability because NASA continues to fund, upgrade, and keep current the in-house 
simulation tools and software as well as the commercially available Matlab® and 
Simulink® products. Workforce, i.e., technical competence and experience of NASA's 
GN&C workforce, had slight improvement due to perceived increased experience of 
JSC's and GSFC's workforce, recent new hiring and fewer retirements occurred than had 
been forecast in 2007 to have had a significant impact by 2009. Significant use of 
support contractors by JSC continues to contribute to stronger GN&C capabilities there. 
NASA's overall GN&C workforce is maturing and more experienced. NASA 
"greybeards" are not retiring in masses, at least not yet. However, it appears a wave of 
NASA retirees could occur in the next few years. A slight improvement in testing 
capabilities may be due to JSC's use of human in the loop testing processes. 
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Significant improvement in GN&C collaboration appears to be due to improved working 
relationships and more time spent working on CxP since th~ 2007 study. 63% of 2009 
study sources had some type of involvement with CxP. Increased comfort with the use of 
collaboration tools such as WebEx® that have become secure is also playing a role. 
GN&C collaboration appears that it could easily continue to improve over the next two 
years with the continued positive impact of NESC's activities, such as the new GN&C 
CoP site, as well as continued growth in tool sharing and cross-Center personnel 
exchanges. 
Technology development activity continues to be regarded as a key area where NASA 
fa lls short and is rated so low mainly due to NASA funding trends as of mid-2009. 
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Figure 9. Relative strength of NASA's GN&C capabilities by area/across all sources 
for 2009 vs. 2007 (1 = poor, 3 = barely acceptable, 5 = excellent) 
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Figure 10. Overall rating of NASA's GN&C capabilities for 2009 vs. 2007 by source 
(1 = poor, 3 = barely acceptable, 5 = excellent) 
These graphs summarize key areas where study sources recognized improvement in the 
GN&C discipline at NASA but also weaknesses or areas for improvement that exist 
within the GN&C discipline at NASA that still need to be addressed. 
It appears the higher rating from NASA HQ, and continued high ratings from GSFC, 
JSC, and MFSF are directly tied to continued strong workforce competence and 
improved collaboration on CxP. Rating declines at JPL and LaRC appear most tied to 
CxP issues and their people's perception that they have had mixed experience/success 
with collaboration, as in the case of LaRC, or are unwilling to do it, as in the case of JPL. 
GN&C collaboration was one of the most important issues addressed in this study, i.e., 
the degree to which it is perceived that NASA Centers share experiences, resources and 
tools. The numbers indicate sources opinion towards the importance or need for 
collaboration. They also indicate the degree of collaboration that each NASA Center does 
or carries out successfully. Higher numbers at GSFC and JSC shows sources there are 
very happy with collaboration, especially GN&C users at JSC. Low numbers at LaRC 
appears to primarily indicate their frustration in collaborating with JSC on CxP. The low 
number at JPL primarily indicates that sources there believe limited GN&C collaboration 
is occurring. It also indicates JPL performs less collaboration than other NASA Centers. 
These findings at LaRC and JPL could have been impacted by the limited sample size. 
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Figure 11. Sources responses to question for 2009 vs. 2007: How well do NASA field 
centers perform GN&C collaboration? (1 = poor, 3 = barely acceptable, 5 = excellent) 
B. What Are NASA's Greatest Technical Challenges In The GN&C Arena? 
Another area addressed in the 2009 study, which was not addressed in 2007 study, was to 
assess study sources opinion regarding NASA's technical challenges in GN&C. The 
NASA Technical Fellow specified I 2 specific sub-discipline technical challenges to be 
addressed to all study contacts. Brown obtained each source's opinion on a 1-10 scale 
(with 10 = highest degree of difficulty) for each technical challenge. Table I 2 
summarizes the sources' opinion regarding the current degree of difficulty for each 
technical challenge. 
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Figure 12. Sources responses to question: What are NASA's greatest technical 
challenges in GN&C? across all sources (1-10 rating, with 10 = greatest and 1 = least 
significant a challenge) 
Sources average ratings for the six project specific technical challenges addressed were: 
GN&C for Planetary Entry Descent and Landing (6.8); Orion LAS G&C (6.7); Robotic 
Spacecraft GN&C (6.5); CEV and Altair Lunar Lander Space Vehicle Handling Qualities (5.9); 
Orion Rendezvous and Docking GN&C (5.4); and GN&C for Ares-I/Ares-IX (5.4). 
C. How Well .Known and How Useful Is The Relatively New GN&C CoP Website? 
Another area addressed in the 2009 study, which was not addressed in 2007, was to get 
feedback from GN&C sources regarding the relatively new GN&C CoP online 
knowledge capture and learning site. Outside of the 13 core GN&C TDT members 64% 
of sources were not aware of the CoP site until Brown contacted them. It was determined 
that 85% of sources had never used the site prior to Brown contacting them. Table 3 
summarizes key information Brown developed after bringing all contacts through a 
demonstration of the CoP site. 
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Issue Feedback 
What is your • Good start (73% of sources); very positive (15%) 
general opinion • Weak (12%); needs work, is too busy/difficult to use 
of the website? • Initial expectations are now low but will grow 
What are its best • Document Library (43%) 
features? • Conferences & Workshops (3 1 %) 
• Find An Expert ( 17%) 
• In The News ( 12%) 
• GN&C Content Oflnterest ( 12%) 
• FAQs (12%) 
• Reading Room (10%) 
Note: The "Find An Expert"feature came on-line in late July after 50% 
qf the responses had already been ;tathered. 
What features • Broaden it across all NASA centers (77%); it is too GSFC-focused, 
should be added there is nothing on JSC, and JPL, LaRC, and MSFC are under-
or improvements represented 
made? • Enhance Content Oflnterest (41 %); e.g., add NASA recs. and 
guidelines, standards, standard updates, reqs, and lessons learned 
• Make it available to the non-NASA GN&C community (36%); e.g., 
support contractors and academia. 
• Add to the Reading Room (2 1%) 
• Improve Find An Expert ( 15%); e.g., broaden it and make it searchable 
• Make the Reading Room linkable (11 %) 
• Make it easy to contribute to the site (8%) 
• Add more links, e.g., to NASA HQ library (8%) 
What is the best • Keep it fresh/current with useful content and data/provide real value 
way to draw and people will find out about it/it will become 'viral' (79%) 
people to the • Advertise/promote it/targeted emails within the GN&C 
website? community/link to it/hand out a newsletter at conferences/face to face 
meetings (63%) 
• Have NESC core TDT members/top management at each center 
inform/meet with their GN&C colleagues (31 %) 
• Provide direct access to documents that people require in ·order to solve 
problems (17%) 
• Personalize it/use graphics and pictures of GN&C contributions and 
GN&C teams associated with on-going missions/make it live with 
blogging (17%) 
Other comments • 75% of non-NASA contacts want access to the CoP site for their 
GN&C people. 
• Some believe it needs to be cutback/consolidated to ease upkeep. 
Table 3. Feedback from study sources regarding various GN&C CoP site issues 
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D. What people said about the GN&C discipline in 2009 
Table 4 provides the most relevant comments about NASA's GN&C discipline 
capabilities, grouped by topic, as obtained by Brown from study sources. 
How Expectations Have Changed Since 2007 
• "My expectations have certainly become broader since we last spoke. GN&C's role is critical on 
Orion in helping me optimize the rest of the system around it and key performance parameters such 
as mass." · · 
• "Increased expectations now exist in collision avoidance·, orbital debris analysis, controlled de-
orbiting, and inter-satellite interaction. There are growing needs and requirements in these areas." 
• "Weare moving more towards improving reliability of existing GN&C capabilities and away 
from advanced and/or more precise capabilities." 
• "Weare really looking for earlier requirements definition particularly for launch vehicles to allow 
initial enveloping of GN&C requirements so software design work is in parallel." · 
NASA's GN&C Workforce 
• "NASA's GN&C workforce continues to improve because ofan increasing experience level. 
JSC's workforce quality has especially improved." 
• "GSFC's workforce is technically excellent across the board. A lot ofGSFC people are highly 
recognized in their field." 
• "JSC's experience level has continued to improve with our work on Orion. Younger engineers 
have been getting a lot of experience. Our staffing has increased as well with a good number of 
cooperative students and new hires." 
• " I am concerned GN&C workforce quality will decline due to a retirement bubble in a few years 
and a hiring gap. I don't see a lot of new hiring occurring at most NASA centers." 
• "NASA has lost some top GN&C people. A lot of the top GN&C people are graybeards and will 
retire soon. I am concerned how much training and mentoring is going on across NASA in 
attitude determination." 
• "GN&C workforce is declining at some NASA centers because the workforce is old. A retirement 
bubble will be occurring shortly at MSFC and LaRC. I am less concerned with JPL and JSC in this 
area." 
• "Hiring still isn't steady enough. We need a consistent ability to hire. The GN&C workforce will 
decline unless we have the ability to backfill as people retire or leave.". · 
• "GN&C workforce has declined and continues to decline because we are not getting the quantity 
and quality of people that we used to get at GSFC and all ofNASA. A retirement bubble is 
imminent within 2-5 years." 
NASA's GN&C Collaboration 
• "Collaboration does matter, but I am not sure how we can get around the distinct cultures and 
competition that can occur between NASA centers." 
• "Collaboration is very strong currently. There is very good cooperation and we work together very 
well. People are getting to know each other and better understand their roles. The Orion flight 
dynamics MOD team is the best example of strong collaboration between JSC, LaRC, JPL and 
ARC." 
• "Collaboration between NASA centers is improving. More exchanges are occurring between 
centers. A means to share secure files has developed between NASA centers and select NASA 
support contractors through ICE. There has also been increased use of WebEx and its equivalents." 
• "NASA is not acting efficiently in terms of collaboration. There is not a Jot of automatic 
collaboration that occurs at NASA in terms of knowledge sharing. Collaboration is forced ." 
• "Agency wide standards for file sharing should be developed. Webcasts and shared white boards 
should also be utilized to improve collaboration." 
Table 4. Relevant quotes regarding NASA GN&C capabilities in 2009 
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NASA's Teclmolouv Deve/opme11t 
• "Has improved due to emerging new GN&C technologies associated with Program Constellation; 
e.g., navigation sensors and algorithm development for hazard avoidance." 
• "Technology development is slightly improving due to ALHA T work, but we do a poor job at 
achieving technology developments. Sensor and actuator technology development activity is very 
poor. We don't anticipate technology development needs. We are busy with flight projects and 
not technology development." 
• "I have a long term concern over the lack of sufficient GN&C hardware in-house development 
opportunities. JSC has chosen to buy and develop a lot of the GN&C hardware and software for 
Orion/CEV on the outside, e.g., through Draper Labs." 
• "Continued decreased funding continues to negatively impact this. I see very isolated examples of 
new technology development; e.g., advanced plasma dynamic thruster advanced propulsion 
systems - i.e., the Variable Specific Impulse Magnetoplasma Rocket (VASIMR®) system 
developed by (Franklin Chang-) Diaz." 
GN&C CoP Website In General 
• "It's new and looks fine as a good start. I like the look and the feel of it." 
• "There is a lot of valuable information on it. It has the potential to be an excellent website." 
• "It's an excellent idea. It's a nice start, a good centralized location for the GN&C COP." 
• "It's a really good tool for GN&C practioners." 
Suuuested New Features/lmproveme11ts To GN&C CoP Website 
• "For a first time user it is difficult to know the place to go to access the website." 
• "Liston-going missions, the GN&C team associated with each mission, and what they want to 
post concerning their missions such as problems they are working on." 
• "Personalize it. Have NASA centers contribute a highlight story. Have a different center featured 
each month. Make it 'the place' for GN&C information." 
"A COP website on GN&C should be a available to non-NASA people. Industry and academia 
should be aware of NASA best practices." 
TIie Future Of The GN& C Discipline (As Viewed In July 2009) 
• "With the concern in lack of NASA funding there has been a drop off in the GN&C discipline. There 
is inadequate investment occurring in NASA's capabilities. There is uncertainty with CxP depending 
on the outcome of the Au~ustine Commission.'' 
Table 4 (Continued). Relevant quotes regarding NASA GN&C capabilities in 2009 
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E. Browns's 2009 Study Conclusions 
After careful consideration and analysis of all the data and other study information 
Brown identified the following key conclusions from the 2009 study: 
)- The state of NASA's GN&C discipline has largely remained stable since 2007. 
The state of the discipline is at least steady if not slightly improved and fairly 
strong. 
)- Mostly positive perceptions exist due to NASA's strong workforce, analytical 
methods and tools, GN&C collaboration and improving GN&C performance 
trend out JSC and GSFC. 
. )- Some mixed perception continues to exist since the 2007 study, primarily due to 
GN&C workforce concerns for the next five (5) years. 
)- Mixed perceptions also exist due to uncertainty with regard to NASA fll;nding and 
the outlook for CxP, poor technology development, concern over GN&C 
facilities, some mixed views regarding. GN&C collaboration, and declining 
GN&C performance trends out of JPL and LaRC. 
)- The GN&C CoP in general is strongest at GSFC, JSC and MSFC. However, it 
appears that the ties to the GN&C GoP could be strengthened at JPL and LaRC. 
The 2007 and 2009 studies by Brown helped the NASA GN&C Technical Fellow to not 
only confirm and validate some of his own perceptions but also to gain new perspectives 
from colleagues within the CoP about other aspects of the GN&C discipline. 
The 2007 and 2009 state of the GN&C discipline assessments also received visibility 
within NASA. The results of the 2007 Brown study were presented to the GN&C TDT 
core members and the NESC Director at LaRC. The 2009 study results were presented to 
the GN&C TDT and the NASA Office of the Chief Engineer at NASA Headquarters. 
Separately a focused discussion on the relevant findings concerning the CoP online site 
was held with CoP website design and development team based at JPL. 
Study contacts appreciated that NESC did the study in 2007 and expected feedback on 
the study results. Study contacts appreciateq that NESC updated the 2007 study in 2009 
and continues to monitor the state of the GN&C discipline within NASA. Such non-
advocate discipline assessments should have broad application to other engineering 
discipline Community of Practices across NASA and it is anticipated that other Technical 
Fellows may perform similar studies. 
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F. "Tying it all Together" (NASA Technical Fellow Conclusions) 
So given the results of the 2007 and 209 Brown studies what can one broadly conclude 
about the state of the GN&C discipline within NASA? The good news is that the GN&C 
discipline at NASA has largely remained stable since 2007. It is mature, healthy, and well 
poised to meet the challenges of the future. Mostly positive perceptions exist due to 
NASA's strong workforce, analytical' methods and tools, GN&C collaboration and the 
improving GN&C performance trend seen across most NASA Centers. Of particular 
importance is the fact that several of the most experienced GN&C engineers within the 
Agency have not yet retired as was anticipated by many to have occured. These senior 
engineers and line managers are providing strong mentoring to the youngest generation of 
the NASA GN&C engineering staff. However we must acknowledge that mixed 
perceptions also exist, primarily due to GN&C wor~force concerns for the next 10 years 
when without doubt the most experienced NASA GN&C engineers will have retired. 
Mixed perceptions also exist due to uncertainty with regard to NASA funding and the 
outlook for CxP, poor technology development, concern over GN&C facilities, some 
mixed views regarding the continuation of GN&C collaborations. 
Fortunately, in the Human Spaceflight arena, the Constellation Program has provided 
multiple challenging learning opportunities for the next generation of GN&C engineers. 
Very positive cross-Center collaborations, primarily between JSC, MSFC and LaRC, 
have occurred during the Orion spacecraft GN&C system design process, the Ares-IX 
and Ares-I launch vehicle flight control system design process and the Orion Launch 
Abort System (LAS) design process. Likewise having multiple robotic spacecraft under 
development at JPL and GSFC has provided GN&C engineers at those Centers 
outstanding learning and development experiences. 
G. The Future for the GN&C CoP and Some Future Study Considerations 
On February 1, 2010 the President's Budget Request was released. This budget request 
has significant potential ramifications for NASA, especially at KSC, JSC and MSFC, as it 
proposes the cancellation of the Constellation Program (CxP) along with the formulation 
of several new program~ that seek to foster a sustainable human space exploration 
enterprise. In response, NASA has formed multiple study teams to investigate options for 
implementing these plans to take the Agency in new directions, if and when authorized 
by Congress. Not to be overlooked is the imminent retirement of the Space Shuttle 
occurring in parallel with these other dramatic changes at NASA. Among these changes 
is the move to include the use of commercial industrial partners for crew and cargo 
delivery to the ISS. Although the Agency's philosophy and approach to exploration will 
apparently change, NASA's fundamental goal remains the same: to send human explorers 
into the solar system to stay. 
Obviously no one has a crystal ball to predict the future of the GN&C discipline within 
NASA as these profound changes unfold. It is however fair to assume that in the next few 
years the GN&C discipline within NASA will most likely remain stable and may in fact 
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prosper with the investment in the development new technologies. Opportunities for 
innovative GN&C system development for robotic spacecraft will likely increase with 
growing demands for Earth and Space Science spacecraft as well as new Robotic 
Precursor vehicles. The challenge of designing and developing a new GN&C system for 
the planned Orion Emergency Rescue Vehicle is on the horizon as well. There is also 
high potential for new funding for GN&C technology development and in-space 
demonstrations of both Autonomous Rendezvous & Docking (AR&D) systems and 
Autonomous Precision Landing (APL) systems. 
A new Flagship Technology Demonstrations Program is currently being planned to 
demonstrate the key technologies NASA needs to reduce the cost and expand the 
capability of future space exploration activities. Large scale on-orbit demonstrations of 
technologies that could be transformational will be performed. The demonstration of 
Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking (AR&D) is a primary objective of the Flagship 
Technology Demonstrations Program. AR&D is the ability of two spacecraft to 
rendezvous, operating independently from human controllers and without other back-up, 
requires advances in sensors, software, and realtime on-orbit positioning and flight 
control, among other challenges. This GN&C-based technology is critical to the ultimate 
success of capabilities such as in-orbit propellant storage and refueling, and complex 
operations in assembling mission components for challenging destinations. 
The Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration (ETDD) Program is also 
currently being planned to develop and demonstrate prototype systems to feed the 
Flagship Technology Demonstrations, robotic precursor, and other missions of 
opportunity. The ETDD Program will develop long-range, critical technologies to 
provide the foundation for a broad set ofNASA's future exploration capabilities. It will 
also provide infusion paths for promising, game-changing technologies developed by 
NASA's Space Technology Program. One key question the ETDD Program will attempt 
to answer is the following: How can we land autonomously, precisely, and safely on a 
extra-terrestrial surf~ce in uncertain environments? An Autonomous Precision Landing 
(APL) demonstration will be performed under this new Program to test an integrated 
GN&C-based autonomous landing and hazard avoidance system consisting of imaging 
sensors together with navigation and control algorithms. NASA plans to develop an 
atmospheric flight experiment to demonstrate an autonomous precision landing and 
hazard avoidance system on a small lander test bed. NASA would pursue use of this 
system on a U. S. or international robotic precursor mission to the Moon or other 
planetary body around 2015. · 
This APL work, similar to the AR&D work, promises to significantly advance NASA's 
GN&C capabilities opening up many new crewed and robotic mission applications. This 
new era in human exploration will challenge the persistence, flexibility, ingenuity and 
innovation of the GN&C CoP. Clearly as NASA changes direction over the next few 
years we must maximize retention of the GN&C skilled personnel, from within NASA 
and its Industry partners that can contribute to future technology developments such as 
· AR&D and APL. 
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The development of groundbreaking new GN&C technologies, including AR&D, APL 
and others, will serve to enable exploration of new worlds and increase our understanding 
of the Earth, our solar system and the universe beyond. The GN&C CoP will need to be 
flexible and responsive to the many coming changes. For example, we will be pressed to 
find new collaborative ways to exploit the International Space Station to increase 
NASA's return on investment by providing an optim'al on-orbit test bed for GN&C 
technology research and development. In order to accomplish our future goals we will 
need cross-Agency GN&C collaborations to continue and to improve and not suffer with 
Centers competing against each other under the stresses of moving forward with new 
NASA direction. 
There are other forthcoming fundamental changes to the way NASA has been doing 
business for over a generation which must be accommodated by the GN&C workforce. 
One is the imminent end of the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) in FYI l . Another is the 
proposed Commercial Crew Initiative. These two major changes are inter-related. The 
closeout of the SSP has the potential to impact the NASA GN&C workforce, particularly 
at those Centers that are focused on Human Spaceflight missions. We must guard against 
any erosion in GN&C capabilities following the Space Shuttle retirement. The skills of 
the highly experienced GN&C hardware and software specialists, who currently provide 
system integration and sustaining engineering functions for the Space Shuttle, will be · 
critical to NASA's plans for developing the Orion Emergency Rescue Vehicle and for 
providing Insight/Oversight functions in support of the Commercial Crew Initiative. The 
Commercial Crew Initiative objectives are to facilitate the development of a U.S. 
commercial crew space transportation capability with the goal of achieving safe, reliable, 
and cost effective access to and from LEO and the International Space Station (ISS). . 
Therefore when the plans being formulated now are implemented, if and when authorized 
by Congress, there will be a stronger reliance by NASA on the commercial providers 
from industry to develop a safe, reliable space vehicle. An NASA Insight/Oversight 
approach is currently envisioned that will require a change in the way NASA and 
industry interact for human spaceflight missions. The goal is for NASA to have in-depth 
insight of the vehicle design through NASA personnel who are embedded in the 
contractor's facility while simultaneously maintaining a more traditional higher-level 
Oversight role of the contractors work. It is reasonable to assume a future demand will be 
placed on NASA's GN&C engineers to assume the responsibility for Insight/Oversight 
roles in support of the Agency's new direction towards utilizing commercial crew 
services. All these developments will no doubt place a strain on the GN&C workforce as 
NASA moves out in all these bold new directions as highlighted above. 
With so much change occurring within NASA and new challenges emerging it will be 
important to monitor and track emerging trends and dynamics of the GN&C·CoP. In light 
of changing directions and the post-Constellation/post-Space Shuttle NASA working 
environment it is likely that a third non-advocate study will be performed in mid-to-late 
2011 to evaluate the state of the GN&C discipline, with a special emphasis on 
understanding GN&C workforce concerns. 
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